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Abstract
We present our approach to the problem of how an agent, within an
economic Multi-Agent System, can determine when it should behave
strategically (i.e. learn and use models of other agents), and when it
should act as a simple price-taker. We provide a framework for the
incremental implementation of modeling capabilities in agents, and
a description of the forms of knowledge required. The agents were
implemented and different populations simulated in order to learn
more about their behavior and the merits of using and learning agent
models. Our results show, among other lessons, how savvy buyers can
avoid being “cheated” by sellers, how price volatility can be used to
quantitatively predict the benefits of deeper models, and how specific
types of agent populations influence system behavior.
1 Introduction
In open, multi-agent systems, agents can come and go without any central
control or guidance, and thus how and which agents interact with each other
will change dynamically. Agents might try to manipulate the interactions to
their individual benefits, at the cost of the global efficiency. To avoid this, the
protocols and mechanisms that the agents engage in might be constructed
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to make manipulation irrational (Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994), but unfor-
tunately this strategy is only applicable in restricted domains. By situating
agents in an economic society, as we do in the University of Michigan Digital
Library (UMDL), we can make each agent responsible for making its own
decisions about when to buy/sell and who to do business with (Atkins et al.,
1996). A market-based infrastructure, built around computational auction
agents, serves to discourage agents from engaging in strategic reasoning to
manipulate the system by keeping the competitive pressures high. However,
since many instances can arise where imperfections in competition could be
exploited, agents might benefit from strategic reasoning, either by manipu-
lating the system or not allowing others to manipulate them. But strategic
reasoning requires effort. An agent in an information economy like the UMDL
must therefore be capable of strategic reasoning and of determining when it
is worthwhile to invest in strategic reasoning rather than letting its welfare
rest in the hands of the market mechanism.
In this paper, we present our approach to the problem of how an agent,
within an economic MAS, can determine when it should behave strategically,
and when it should act as a simple price-taker. More specifically, we let the
agent’s strategy consist of learning nested models of the other agents, so the
decision it must make refers to which of the models will give it greater gains.
We show how, in some circumstances, agents benefit by learning and using
models of others, while at other times the extra effort is wasted. Our results
point to metrics that can be used to make quantitative predictions as to the
benefits obtained from learning and using deeper models.
1.1 Related work
Different research communities have run across the problems that arise from
having agents learning in societies of learning agents. The studies of (Shoham
and Tennenholtz, 1992), and (Glance, 1993) focus on very simple but numer-
ous agents and emphasize their emergent behavior. (Hu and Wellman, 1996)
show that learning agents in an economic domain sometimes converge to
globally sub-optimal equilibria. The work on agent-based modeling (Hu¨bler
and Pines, 1994; Axelrod, 1984; Epstein and Axtell, 1996) of complex sys-
tems studies slightly more complicated agents that are meant as stand-ins
for real world agents (e.g. insects, communities, corporations, people).
All these researchers used agents whose learning abilities consist of choos-
ing from among a set of fixed strategies. They do not explicitly consider the
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fact that the agents inhabit communities of learning agents. That is, their
agents do not try to model other agents. We address this issue and try to
determine when and which models an agent should keep.
Within the MAS community, some work (Sen, 1996) has focused on
how artificial AI-based learning agents would fare in communities of simi-
lar agents. For example, (Nadella and Sen, 1997) and (Terabe et al., 1997)
show how agents can learn the capabilities of others via repeated interactions,
but these agents do not learn to predict what actions other might take. Most
of the work in MAS also fails to recognize the possible gains from using ex-
plicit agent models to predict agent actions. (Tambe and Rosenbloom, 1996)
is an exception and gives another approach for using nested agent models.
However, they do not go so far as to try to quantify the advantages of their
nested models or show how these could be learned via observations. We
believe that our research will bring to the foreground some of the common
observations seen in these research areas and help to clarify the implications
and utility of learning and using nested agent models.
2 Description of the UMDL
The UMDL project is a large-scale, multidisciplinary effort to design and
build a flexible, scalable infrastructure for rendering library services in a
digital networked environment. In order to meet these goals, we chose to
implement the library as a collection of interacting agents, each specialized
to perform a particular task. These agents buy and sell goods/services from
each other, within an artificial economy, in an effort to make a profit. Since
the UMDL is an open system, which will allow third parties to build and
integrate their own agents into the architecture, we treat all agents as purely
selfish.
2.1 Implications of the information economy.
Information goods/services, like those provided in the UMDL, are very hard
to compartmentalize into equivalence classes that all agents can agree on.
For example, if a web search engine service is defined as a good, then all
agents providing web search services can be considered as selling the same
good. It is likely, however, that a buyer of this good might decide that
seller s1 provides better answers than seller s2. We cannot possibly hope to
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enumerate the set of reasons an agent might have for preferring one set of
answers (and thus one search agent) over another, and we should not try to
do so. It should be up to the individual buyers to decide what items belong
to the same good category, each buyer clustering items in possibly different
ways.
This situation is even more evident when we consider an information
economy rooted in some information delivery infrastructure (e.g. the Inter-
net). There are two main characteristics that set this economy apart from a
traditional economy.
• There is virtually no cost of reproduction. Once the information is
created it can be duplicated virtually for free.
• All agents have virtually direct and free access to all other agents.
If these two characteristics are present in an economy, it is useless to
talk about supply and demand, since supply is practically infinite for any
particular good and available everywhere. The only way agents can survive
in such an economy is by providing value-added services that are tailored to
meet their customers’ needs. Each provider will try to differentiate his goods
from everyone else’s while each buyer will try to find those suppliers that
best meet her value function. We propose to build agents that can achieve
these goals by learning models of other agents and making strategic decisions
based on these models. These techniques can also be applied, with variable
levels of efficacy, to traditional economies.
3 A Simplified Model of the UMDL
In order to capture the main characteristics of the UMDL, and to facilitate
the development and testing of agents, we have defined an “abstract” eco-
nomic model. We define an economic society of agents as one where each
agent is either a buyer or a seller of some particular good. The set of buyers
is B and the set of sellers is S. These agents exchange goods by paying some
price p ∈ P , where P is a finite set. The buyers are capable of assessing the
quality of a good received and giving it some value q ∈ Q, where Q is also a
finite set.
The exchange protocol, seen in Figure 1, works as follows: When a buyer
b ∈ B wants to buy a good g, she will advertise this fact. Each seller s ∈ S
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that sells that good will give his bid in the form of a price pgs. The buyer
will pick one of these and will pay the seller. All agents will be made aware
of this choice along with the prices offered by all the sellers.. The winning
seller will then return1 the specified good. Note that there is no law that
forces the seller to return a good of any particular quality. For example, an
agent that sells web search services returns a set of hits as its good. Each
buyer of this good might determine its quality based on the time it took for
the response to arrive, the number of hits, the relevance of the hits, or any
combination of these and/or other features. Therefore, it would usually be
impossible to enforce a quality measure that all buyers can agree with.
It is thus up to the buyer to assess the quality q of the good received.
Each buyer b also has a value function V gb (p, q) for each good g ∈ G that she
might wish to buy. The function returns a number that represents the value
that b assigns to that particular good at that particular price and quality.
Each seller s ∈ S, on the other hand, has a cost cgs associated with each good
he can produce. Since we assume that costs and payments are expressed
in the same units (i.e. money) then, if seller s gets paid p for good g, his
profit will be Profit(p, cgs) = p − c
g
s. The buyers, therefore, have the goal of
maximizing the value they get for their transactions, while the sellers have
the goal of maximizing their profits.
4 Learning recursive models
Agents placed in the economic society we just described will have to learn,
typically via trial and error, what actions give them the highest expected
reward and under which circumstances. In this section we will present tech-
niques that these agents might use to maximize their rewards.
An important question we wish to answer is: when do agents benefit
from having deeper nested models of other agents? It seems intuitive that,
ignoring computational costs, the agents with more complete models of others
will always do better. We find this to be usually true; however, while there
are instances when it is significantly better to have deeper models, there are
also instances when the difference is barely noticeable and, instances when
its better to ignore deeper models if they are imperfect or provide no useful
1In the case of agent/link failure, each agent is free to set its own timeouts and assess
the quality of the never-received good accordingly. Bids that are not received in time will,
of course, not be considered.
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information. These instances are defined in part by the set of other agents
present, their capabilities and preferences, and the dynamics of the system.
In order to precisely determine what these instances are, and in the hopes
of providing a more general framework for studying the effects of increased
agent-modeling capabilities within our economic model, we have defined a
set of techniques that our agents can use for learning and using models.
We divide the agents into classes that correspond to their modeling ca-
pabilities. The hierarchy we present is inspired by the Recursive Modeling
Method (Gmytrasiewicz, 1996), but is function-based rather than matrix-
based, and includes learning. We will first describe our agents at the knowl-
edge level, stating only the type of knowledge the agents are either trying to
acquire through learning, or already have (i.e. knowledge that was directly
implemented by the designers of the agents), and will then explain the details
of how this knowledge was implemented.
At the most abstract level, we can say that every agent i is trying to learn
the oracle decision function ∆i : w → ai, which maps the state w of the world
into the action ai that the agent should take in that state. This function will
not be fixed throughout the lifetime of the agent because the other agents
are also engaged in some kind of learning themselves. The agents that try
to directly learn ∆i(w) we refer to as 0-level agents, because they have no
explicit models of other agents. In fact, they are not aware that there are
other agents in the world. Any such agent i will learn a decision function
δi : w → ai where w is what agent i knows about its external world and ai
is its rational action in that state. For example, a web search agent might
look at the going price for web searches, in order to determine how much to
charge for its service.
Agents with 1-level models of other agents, on the other hand, are aware
that there are other agents out there but have no idea what the “interior”
of these agents looks like. They have two kinds of knowledge— a set of
functions δij : w → aj which capture agent i’s model of each of the other
agents (j), and δi : (w,~a−i)→ ai which captures i’s knowledge of what action
to take given w and the collective actions ~a−i the others will take. We define
~a−i = {a1 · · · ai−1, ai+1 · · ·an}, where n is the number of agents. An agent’s
model of others might not be correct; therefore, it is not always true that
δj(w) = δij(w). The δij(w) knowledge for all j 6= i turns out to be easier to
learn than the joint action δi(w,~a−i) because the set of possible hypotheses
is smaller.
Agents with 2-level models are assumed to have deeper knowledge about
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the other agents; that is, they have knowledge of the form δij : (w,~a−j)→ aj .
This knowledge tells them how others determine which action to take. They
also know what actions others think others are going to take, i.e. δijk : w →
ak, and (like 1-level modelers) what action they should take given others’
actions, δi : (w,~a−i)→ ai. Again, the δijk(w) is easier to learn that the other
two, as long as all agents use the same features to discriminate among the
different worlds (i.e. share the same w).
4.1 Populating the knowledge
If the different level agents had to learn all the knowledge then, since the 0-
level agents have a lot less knowledge to learn, they would learn it much faster.
However, in the economic domain, it is likely that the designer has additional
knowledge which could be incorporated into the agents. The agents we built
incorporated extra knowledge along these lines.
We decided that 0-level agents would learn all their knowledge by tracking
their actions and the rewards they got. These agents, therefore, receive
no extra domain knowledge from the designers and learn everything from
experience. 1-level agents, on the other hand, have a priori knowledge of
what action they should take given the actions that others will take. That
is, while they try to learn knowledge of the form δij(w) by observing the
actions others take (i.e. in a form of supervised learning where the other
agents act as tutors), they already have knowledge of the form δi(w,~a−i).
In our economic domain, it is reasonable to assume that agents have this
knowledge since, in fact, this type of knowledge can be easily generated.
That is, if I know what all the other sellers are going to bid, and the prices
that the buyer is willing to pay, then it is easy for me to determine which
price to bid. We must also point out that in this domain, the δi(w,~a−i)
knowledge cannot be used by a 0-level agent. If this knowledge had said,
for instance, that from some state w agent i will only ever take one of a
few possible actions, then this knowledge could have been used to eliminate
impossibilities from the δi(w) knowledge of a 0-level agent. However, this
situation never arises in our domain because, as we shall see in the following
Sections, the states used by the agents permit the set of reasonable actions
to always be equal to the set of all possible actions.
The 2-level agents learn their δijk(w) knowledge from observations of
others’ actions, under the already stated assumption that there is common
knowledge of the fact that all agents see the actions taken by all. The rest of
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the knowledge, i.e. δij(w,~a−j) and δi(w,~a−i), is built into the 2-level agents
a priori. As with 1-level agents, we cannot use the δij(w,~a−j) knowledge to
add δij(w) knowledge to a 1-level modeler, because other agents are also free
to take any one of the possible actions in any state of the world. There are
many reasonable ways to explain how the 2-level agents came to possess the
δij(w,~a−j) knowledge. It could be, for instance, that the designer assumed
that the other designers would build 1-level agents with the same knowledge
we just described. This type of recursive thinking (i.e. “they will do just
as I did, so I must do one better”), along with the obvious expansion of
the knowledge structure, could be used to generate n-level agents, but so far
we have concentrated only on the first three levels. The different forms of
knowledge, and their form of acquisition, are summarized in Table 1. In the
following sections, we talk about each one of these agents in more detail and
give some specifics on their implementation. Our current model emphasizes
transactions over a single good, so each agent is only a buyer or a seller, but
cannot be both.
4.2 Agents with 0-level models
Agents with 0-level models must learn everything they know from observa-
tions they make about the environment, and from any rewards they get. In
our economic society this means that buyers see the bids they receive and
the good received after striking a contract, while sellers see the request for
bids and the profit they made (if any). In general, these agents get some
input, take an action, then receive some reward. This framework is the same
framework used in reinforcement learning, which is why we decided to use a
form of reinforcement learning (Sutton, 1988) (Watkins and Dayan, 1992),
for implementing learning in our agents.
Both buyers and sellers will use the equations in the next few sections for
determining what actions to take. But, with a small probability ǫ they will
choose to explore, instead of exploit, and will pick their actions at random
(except for the fact that sellers never bid below cost). The value of ǫ is
initially 1 but decreases with time to some empirically chosen, fixed minimum
value ǫmin. That is,
ǫt+1 =
{
γǫt if γǫt > ǫmin
ǫmin otherwise
where 0 < γ < 1 is some annealing factor.
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Time 1
Time 2
Time 3
B
S1
S2
S3
request-bid
B
S1
S2
S3
B S3
p1
p3
p2
Pick-bid
payment
B S3
good
Assess-quality
Time 4
Figure 1: View of the protocol. We show only one buyer B and three sellers
S1, S2, and S3. At time 1 the buyer requests bids for some good. At time
2 the sellers send their prices for that good. At time 3 the buyer picks one
of the bids, pays the seller the amount and then, at time 4, she receives the
good.
Level Form of Knowledge Method of Acquisition
0-level δi(w) Reinforcement Learning
1-level δi(w,~a−i) Previously known
δij(w) Learn from observation
2-level δi(w,~a−i) Previously known
δij(w,~a−j) Previously known
δijk(w) Learn from observation.
Table 1: Summary of the forms of knowledge that the different agents have
or are trying to learn.
9
4.2.1 Buyers with 0-level models.
A buyer b will start by requesting bids for a good g. She will then receive all
bids for good g and will pick the seller:
s∗ = args∈S max f
g(pgs) (1)
This function implements the buyer’s δb(w) which, in this case, can be
rephrased as δb(p1 . . . p|S|). The function f
g(p) returns the value the buyer
expects to get if she buys good g at a price of p. It is learned using a simple
form of reinforcement learning, namely:
f
g
t+1(p) = (1− α)f
g
t (p) + α · V
g
b (p, q) (2)
Here α is the learning rate, p is the price b pays for the good, and q is
the quality she ascribes to it. The learning rate is initially set to 1 and, like
ǫ, is decreased until it reaches some fixed minimum value αmin.
4.2.2 Sellers with 0-level models.
When asked for a bid, the seller s will provide one whose price is greater
than or equal2 to the cost for producing it (i.e. pgs ≥ c
g
s). From these prices,
he will chose the one with the highest expected profit:
p∗s = argp∈P maxh
g
s(p) (3)
Again, this function encompasses the seller’s δs(g) knowledge, where we now
have that the states are the goods being sold w = g, and the actions are
prices offered a = p. The function hgs(p) returns the profit s expects to get if
he offers good g at a price p. It is also learned using reinforcement learning,
as follows:
h
g
t+1(p) = (1− α)h
g
t (p) + α · Profit
g
s(p) (4)
where
Profitgs(p) =
{
p− cgs if his bid is chosen
0 otherwise
(5)
2We could just as easily have said that the price must be strictly greater than the cost.
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4.3 Agents with One-level Models
The next step is for an agent to keep one-level models of the other agents.
This means that it has no idea of what the interior (i.e. “mental”) processes of
the other agents are, but it recognizes the fact that there are other agents out
there whose behaviors influence its rewards. The agent, therefore, can only
model others by looking at their past behavior and trying to predict, from it,
their future actions. The agent also has knowledge, implemented as functions,
that tells it what action to take, given a probability distribution over the set
of actions that other agents can take. In the actual implementation, as shown
below, the δi(w,~a−i) knowledge takes into account the fact that the δij(w)
knowledge is constantly being learned and, therefore, is not correct with
perfect certainty.
4.3.1 Buyers with one-level models.
A buyer with one-level models can now keep a history of the qualities she
ascribes to the goods returned by each seller. She can, in fact, remember
the last N qualities returned by some seller s for some good g, and define
a probability density function qgs(x) over the qualities x returned by s (i.e.
qgs (x) returns the probability that s returns an instance of good g that has
quality x). This function provides the δbs(g) knowledge. She can use the
expected value of this function to calculate which seller she expects will give
her the highest expected value.
s∗ = args∈S maxE(V
g
b (p
g
s, q
g
s(x)))
= args∈S max
1
|Q|
∑
x∈Q
qgs (x) · V
g
b (p
g
s, x) (6)
The δb(g, q1 · · · q|S|) is given by the previous function which simply tries
to maximize the value the buyer expects to get. The buyer does not need to
model other buyers since they do not affect the value she gets.
4.3.2 Sellers with one-level models.
Each seller will try to predict what bid the other sellers will submit (based
solely on what they have bid in the past), and what bid the buyer will likely
pick. A complete implementation would require the seller to remember past
combinations of buyers, bids and results (i.e. who was buying, who bid what,
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and who won). However, it is unrealistic to expect a seller to remember all
this since there are at least |P ||S| · |B| possible combinations.
However, the seller’s one-level behavior can be approximated by having
him remember the last N prices accepted by each buyer b for each good g,
and form a probability density function mgb(x), which returns the probability
that b will accept (pick) price p for good g. The expected value of this
function provides the δsb(g) knowledge. Similarly, the seller remembers other
sellers’ last N bids for good g and forms ngs(y), which gives the probability
that s will bid y for good g. The expected value of this function provides
the δs(g) knowledge. The seller s can now determine which bid maximizes
his expected profits.
p∗ = argp∈P max(p− c
g
s) ·
∏
s′∈{S−s}
∑
p′∈P
{
n
g
s′(p
′) if mgb(p
′) ≤ mgb(p)
0 otherwise
(7)
Note that this function also does a small amount of approximation by
assuming that s wins whenever there is a tie3. The function calculates the
best bid by determining, for each possible bid, the product of the profit and
the probability that the agent will get that profit. Since the profit for lost bids
is 0, we only need to consider the cases where s wins. The probability that
s will win can then be found by calculating the product of the probabilities
that his bid will beat the bids of each of the other sellers. The function
approximates the δs(g, pb, p1 · · · p|S|) knowledge.
4.4 Agents with Two-level Models
The intentional models we use correspond to the functions used by agents
that use one-level models. The agents’ δi(w,~a−i) knowledge has again been
expanded to take into account the fact that the deeper knowledge is learned
and might not be correct. The δijk(w) knowledge is learned from observation,
under the assumption that there is common knowledge of the fact that all
agents see the bids given by all agents.
3The complete solution would have to consider the probabilities that s ties with 1, 2,
3,. . . other agents. In order to do this we would need to consider all |P ||S| subsets.
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4.4.1 Buyers with two-level models.
Since the buyer receives bids from the sellers, there is no need for her to try to
out-guess or predict what the sellers will bid. She is also not concerned with
what the other buyers are doing since, in our model, there is an effectively
infinite supply of goods. The buyers are, therefore, not competing with each
other and do not need to keep deeper models of others.
4.4.2 Sellers with two-level models.
A seller will model other sellers as if they were using the one-level models.
That is, he thinks they will model others using policy models and make
their decisions using the equations presented in Section 4.3.2. He will try to
predict their bids and then try to find a bid for himself that the buyer will
prefer more than all the bids of the other sellers. His model of the buyer will
also be an intentional model. He will model the buyers as though they were
implemented as explained in Section 4.3.1. A seller, therefore, assumes that
it has the correct intentional models of other agents.
The algorithm he follows is to first use his models of the sellers to predict
what bids pi they will submit. He has a model of the buyer C(s1 · · · sn, p1 · · · pn)→
si, that tells him which seller she might choose given the set of bids pi sub-
mitted by each seller si. The seller sj uses this model to determine which of
his bids will bring him higher profit, by first finding the set of bids he can
make that will win:
P ′ = {pj |pj ∈ P, sj = C(s1 · · · sj · · · sn, p1 · · · pj · · ·pn)} (8)
And from these finding the one with the highest profit:
p∗ = argp∈P ′ max(p− c
g
s) (9)
These functions provide the δs(g, pb, p1 · · · p|S|) knowledge.
5 Tests
Since there is no obvious way to analytically determine how different pop-
ulations of agents would interact and, of greater interest to us, how much
better (or worse) the agents with deeper models would fare, we decided to
implement a society of the agents described above and ran it to test our
13
hypotheses. In all tests, we had 5 buyers and 8 sellers. The buyers had the
same value function Vb(p, q) = 3q − p, which means that if p = q then the
buyers will prefer the seller that offers the higher quality. The quality that
they perceived was the same only on average, i.e. any particular good might
be thought to have quality that is slightly higher or lower than expected. All
sellers had costs equal to the quality they returned in order to support the
common sense assumption that quality goods cost more to produce. A set
of these buyers and sellers is what we call a population. We tried various
populations; within each population we kept constant the agents’ modeling
levels, the value assessment functions and the qualities returned. The tests
involved a series of such populations, each one with agents of different mod-
eling levels, and/or sellers with different quality/costs. We also set αmin = .1,
ǫmin = .05, and γ = .99. There were 100 runs done for each population of
agents, each run consisting of 10000 auctions (i.e. iterations of the protocol).
The lessons presented in the next section are based on the averages of these
100 runs.
6 Lessons
From our tests we were able to discern several lessons about the dynamics
of different populations of agents. Some of these lead to methods that can
be used to make quantitative predictions about agents’ performance, while
others make qualitative assessments about the type of behaviors we might
expect. We detail these in the next subsections, and summarize them in
Table 2.
6.1 Micro versus macro behaviors.
In all tests, we found the behavior for any particular run does not necessarily
reflect the average behavior of the system. The prices have a tendency to
sometimes reach temporary stable points. These conjectural equilibria, as
described in (Hu and Wellman, 1996), are instances when all of the agents’
models are correctly predicting the others’ behavior and, therefore, the agents
do not need to change their models or their actions. These conjectural equi-
libria points are seldom global optima for the agents. If one of our agents
finds itself at one of these equilibrium points, since the agent is always explor-
ing with probability ǫ, it will in time discover that this point is only a local
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optima (i.e. it can get more profit selling/buying at a different price) and
will change its actions accordingly. Only when the price is an equilibrium
price4 do we find that the agents continue to forever take the same actions,
leaving the price at its equilibrium point.
In order to understand the more significant macro-level behaviors of the
system, we present results that are based on the averages from many runs.
While these averages seem very stable, and a good first step in learning
to understand these systems, in the future we will need to address some
of the micro-level issues. We do notice from our data that the micro-level
behaviors (e.g. temporary conjectural equilibria, price fluctuations) are much
more closely tied, usually in intuitive ways, to the agents’ learning rate α and
exploration rate ǫ. That is, higher rates for both of these lead to more price
fluctuations and shorter temporary equilibria.
6.2 0-level buyers and sellers.
This type of population is equivalent to a “blind” auction, where the agents
only see the price and the good, but are prevented from seeing who the
seller (or buyer) was. As expected, we found that an equilibrium is reached
as long as all the sellers are providing the same quality. This is the case
for population 1 in Figure 2. Otherwise, if the sellers offer different quality
goods, the price fluctuates as the buyers try to find the price that on the
whole returns the best quality, and the sellers try to find the price5 the
buyers favor. In these populations, the sellers offering the higher quality,
at a higher cost, lose money. Meanwhile, sellers offering lower quality, at
a lower cost, earn some extra income by selling their low quality goods to
buyers that expect, and are paying for, higher quality. As more sellers start to
offer lower quality, we find that the mean price actually increases, evidently
because price acts as a signal for quality and the added uncertainty makes
the higher prices more likely to give the buyer a higher value. We see this
in Figure 2, where population 1 has all sellers returning the same quality
while in each successive population more agents offer lower quality. The
price distribution for population 1 is concentrated on 9, but for populations
2 through 6 it flattens and shifts to the right, increasing the mean price. It is
4That is, p is an equilibrium price if every seller that can sell at that price (i.e. those
whose cost is less than p) does.
5Remember, the sellers are constrained to return a fixed quality. They can only change
the price they charge.
15
00.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y
Prices
Price Distributions
Pop. 1
Pop. 2
Pop. 3
Pop. 4
Pop. 5
Pop. 6
Pop. 7
Pop. 8
Figure 2: Price distributions for populations of 0-level buyers and sellers.
The prices are 0 · · · 19. The columns represent the percentage of time the
good was sold at each price, in each population. In p1 sellers return qualities
{8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8}, in p2 its {8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8, 7, 8}, and so on such that by p8
its {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. The highest peak in all populations corresponds to
price 9.
16
only by population 7 when it starts to shift back to the left, thus reducing the
mean price, as seen in Figure 3. That is, it is only after a significant number
of sellers start to offer lower quality that we see the mean price decrease.
6.3 0-level buyers and sellers, plus one 1-level seller.
In these population sets we explored the advantages that a 1-level seller has
over identical 0-level sellers. The advantage was non-existent when all sellers
returned the same quality (i.e. when the prices reached an equilibrium as
shown in population 1 in Figure 4), but increased as the sellers started to
diverge in the quality they returned. In order to make these findings useful
when building agents, we needed a way to make quantitative predictions as to
the benefits of keeping 1-level models. It turns out that these benefits can be
predicted, not by the population type as we had first guessed, but by the price
volatility. We define volatility as the number of times the price changes from
one auction to the next, divided by the total number of auctions. Figure 5
shows the linear relation between volatility and the percentage of times the
1-level seller wins. The two lines correspond to two “types” of volatility. The
first line includes populations 1 through 5 (p1-p5). It reflects the case where
the buyers’ second-favorite (and possibly, the third, fourth, etc.) equilibrium
price is greater than her most preferred price. In these cases the buyers
and sellers fight among the two most preferred prices, the sellers pulling
towards the higher equilibrium price and the buyers towards the lower one,
as shown by the two peaks in populations 4 and 5 in Figure 4. The other line,
which includes populations 6 and 7, corresponds to cases where the buyers’
preferred equilibrium price is greater than the runner-ups. In these cases
there is no contest between two equilibria. We observe only one peak in the
price distribution for these populations.
The slope of these lines can be easily calculated and the resulting function
can be used by a seller agent for making a quantitative prediction as to
how much he would benefit by switching to 1-level models. That is, he
could measure price volatility, multiply it by the appropriate slope, and the
resulting number would be the percentage of times he would win. However,
for this to work the agent needs to know that all eight buyers and five sellers
are 0-level modelers because different types of populations lead to different
slopes. Also, slight changes in our learning parameters (.02 ≤ ǫmin ≤ .08 and
.05 ≤ αmin ≤ .2) lead to slight changes in the slopes so these would have to
be taken into account if the agent is actively changing its parameters.
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Figure 4: Price distributions for populations of 0-level buyers and 0-level
sellers plus one 1-level seller. In population 1 sellers return qualities
{2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2}, in pop. 2 its {2, 3, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2}, and so on such that
by pop. 7 it’s {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2}. The 1-level seller is the last on the list. It
always returns quality 2.
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We also want to make clear a small caveat, which is that the volatility
that is correlated to the usefulness of keeping 1-level models is the volatility
of the system with the agent already doing 1-level modeling. Fortunately,
our experiments show that having one agent change from 0-level to 1-level
does not have a great effect on the volatility as long as there are enough (i.e.
more than five or so) other sellers.
The reason volatility is such a good predictor is that it serves as an accu-
rate assessment of how dynamic the system is and, in turn, of the complexity
of the learning problem faced by the agents. It turns out that the learning
problem faced by 1-level agents is “simpler” than the one faced by 0-level
modelers. Our 0-level agents use reinforcement learning to learn a good
match between world states and the actions they should take. The 1-level
agents, on the other hand, can see the actions other agents take and do not
need to learn their models through indirect reinforcements. They instead
use a form of supervised learning to learn the models of others. Since 1-level
agents need fewer interactions to learn a correct model, their models will,
in general, be better than those of 0-level agents in direct proportion to the
speed with which the target function changes. That is, in a slow-changing
world both of them will have time enough to arrive at approximately cor-
rect models, while in a fast-changing world only the 1-level agents will have
time to arrive at an approximately correct model. This explains why high
price volatility is correlated to an increase in the 1-level agent’s performance.
However, as we saw, the relative advantages for different volatilities (i.e. the
slope in Figure 5) will also depend on the shape of the price distribution and
the particular population of agents.
Finally, in all populations where the buyers are 0-level, we saw that it
really pays for the sellers to have low costs because this allows them to lower
their prices to fit almost any demand. Since the buyers have 0-level models,
the sellers with low quality and cost can raise their prices when appropriate,
in effect “pretending” to be the high-quality sellers, and make an even more
substantial profit. This extra profit comes at the cost of a reduction in the
average value that the buyers receive. In other words, the buyers get less
value because they are only 0-level agents and are less able to detect the
sellers’ deception. In the next Section we will see how this is not true for
1-level buyers.
Of course, the 1-level sellers were more successful at this deception strat-
egy than the 0-level sellers. Figure 6 shows the profit of several agents in a
population as a function of their cost. We can see how the 0-level agents’
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Figure 5: Scatter plot of volatility versus the percentage of time that the
1-level seller wins (w). The populations are the same as in Figure 4.
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Figure 6: Agents’ profit in population 7 from Figure 4. The sellers return
qualities of {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 2}, respectively, where the 1-level seller is the
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profit decreases with increasing costs, and how the 1-level agent’s profit is
much higher than the 0-level with the same costs. We also notice that, since
the 0-level agents are not as successful as the 1-level at taking advantage of
their low costs, the first 0-level seller (that returns quality 2) has lower profit
than the rest as some of his profit was taken away by the 1-level seller (that
returns the same quality).
6.4 1-level buyers and 0 and 1-level sellers.
In these populations the buyers have the upper hand. They quickly identify
those sellers that provide the highest quality goods and buy exclusively from
them. The sellers do not benefit from having deeper models; in fact, Figure 7
shows how the 1-level seller’s profit is less than that of a similar 0-level seller
because the 1-level seller tries to charge higher prices than the 0-level seller.
The 1-level buyers do not fall for this trick— they know what quality to
expect, and buy more from the lower-priced 0-level seller(s). We have here
a case of erroneous models— 1-level sellers assume that buyers are 0-level,
and since this is not true, their erroneous deductions lead them to make bad
decisions. To stay a step ahead, sellers would need to be 2-level in this case.
In Figure 7, the first population has all sellers returning a quality of 8
while by population 7 they are returning qualities of {8, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}, re-
spectively, with the 1-level always returning quality of 8. We notice that the
difference in profits between the 0-level and the 1-level increases with succes-
sive populations. This is explained by the fact that in the first population
all seven 0-level sellers are returning the same quality, while by population 7
only the 0-level pictured (i.e. the first one) is still returning quality 8. This
means that his competition, in the form of other 0-level sellers returning the
same quality, decreases for successive populations. Meanwhile, in all pop-
ulations there is only one 1-level seller who has no competition from other
1-level sellers. To summarize, the 0-level seller’s profit is always higher than
the similar 1-level seller’s, and the difference increases as there are fewer
other competing 0-level sellers who offer the same quality.
6.5 1-level buyers and several 1-level sellers.
We have shown how 1-level sellers do better, on average, than 0-level sellers
when faced with 0-level buyers, but this is not true anymore if too many
0-level sellers decide to become 1-level. Figure 8 shows how the profits of a
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1-level seller decrease as he is joined by other 1-level sellers. In this Figure
the sellers are returning qualities of {2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 3, 4}. Initially they are all
0-level, then one of the sellers with quality 2 becomes 1-level (he is the seller
shown in the Figure), then another one and so on. . . until there is only one
0-level seller with quality two. Then the seller with quality three becomes
1-level and, finally the seller with quality four becomes 1-level. At this point
we have six 1-level sellers and one 0-level seller. We can see that with more
than four 1-level sellers the 0-level seller is actually making more profit than
the similar 1-level seller. The 1-level seller’s profit decreases because, as
more sellers change from 0 to 1-level, they are competing directly with him
since they are offering the same quality and are the same level. Notice that
the 1-level seller’s curve flattens after four 1-level sellers are present in the
population. The reason is that the next sellers to change over to 1-level
return qualities of 3 and 4, respectively, so that they do not compete directly
with the seller pictured. His profits, therefore, do not keep decreasing.
For this test, and other similar tests, we had to use a population of sellers
that produce different qualities because, as explained in Section 6.3, if they
had returned the same quality then an equilibrium would have been reached
which would prevent the 1-level sellers from making a significantly greater
profit than the 0-level sellers.
6.6 1-level buyers and 1 and 2-level sellers.
Assuming that the 2-level seller has perfect models of the other agents, we
find that he wins an overwhelming percentage of the time. This is true,
surprisingly enough, even when some of the 1-level sellers offer slightly higher
quality goods. However, when the quality difference becomes too great (i.e.
greater than 1), the buyers finally start to buy from the high quality 1-
level sellers. This case is very similar to the ones with 0-level buyers and 0
and 1-level sellers and we can start to discern a recurring pattern. In this
case, however, it is much more computationally expensive to maintain 2-level
models. On the other hand, since these 2-level models are perfect, they are
better predictors than the 1-level, which explains why the 2-level seller wins
much more than the 1-level seller from Section 6.3.
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Buyers Sellers Lessons
0-level 0-level Equilibrium reached only when all sellers offer
the same quality. Otherwise, we get oscillations.
Mean price increases when quality offered decreases.
0-level Any Sellers have big incentives to lower quality/cost.
0-level 0-level and 1-level seller beats others.
one 1-level Quantitative advantage of being 1-level predicted by
volatility and price distribution.
0-level 0-level and 1-level sellers do better, as long as there
many 1-level are not too many of them.
1-level 0-level and Buyers have upper hand. They buy from the most
one 1-level preferred seller.
1-level sellers are usually at a disadvantage.
1-level 1-level and Since 2-level has perfect models, it wins an
one 2-level overwhelming percentage of time, except
when it offers a rather lower quality.
Table 2: Summary of lessons. In all cases the buyers had identical value
and quality assessment functions. Sellers were constrained to always return
the same quality.
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7 Conclusions
We have presented a framework for the development of agents with incremen-
tal modeling/learning capabilities, in an economic society of agents. These
agents were built, and the execution of different agent populations leads us to
the discovery of the lessons summarized in Table 2. The discovery of volatil-
ity and price distributions as predictors of the benefits of deeper models will
be very useful as guides for deciding how much modeling capability to build
into an agent. This decision could either be done prior to development or,
given enough information, it could be done at runtime. We are also encour-
aged by the fact that increasing the agents’ capabilities changes the system
in ways that we can recognize from our everyday economic experience.
Some of the agent structures shown in this paper are already being im-
plemented into the UMDL (Atkins et al., 1996). We have a basic economic
infrastructure that allows agents to engage in commerce, and the agents
use customizable heuristics for determining their strategic behavior. We are
working on incorporating the more advanced modeling capabilities into our
agents in order to enable more interesting strategic behaviors.
Our results showed how sellers with deeper models fare better, in gen-
eral, even when they produce less valuable goods. This means that we should
expect those types of agents to, eventually, be added into the UMDL6. For-
tunately, this advantage is diminished by having buyers keep deeper models.
We expect that there will be a level at which the gains and costs associ-
ated with keeping deeper models balance out for each agent. Our hope is
to provide a mechanism for agents to dynamically determine this cutoff and
constantly adjust their behavior to maximize their expected profits given the
current system behavior. The lessons in this paper are a significant step in
this direction. We have seen that one needs to look at price volatility and at
the modeling levels of the other agents to determine what modeling level will
give the highest profits. We have also learned how buyers and sellers of dif-
ferent levels and offering different qualities lead to different system dynamics
which, in turn, dictate whether the learning of nested models is useful or not.
We are considering the expansion of the model with the possible additions
of agents that can both buy and sell, and sellers that can return different
quality goods. Allowing sellers to change the quality returned to fit the
buyer will make them more competitive against 1-level buyers. We are also
6If not by us, then by a profit-conscious third party.
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continuing tests on many different types of agent populations in the hopes
of getting a better understanding of how well different agents fare in the
different populations.
In the long run, another offshoot of this research could be a better charac-
terization of the types of environments and how they allow/inhibit “cheating”
behavior in different agent populations. That is, we saw how, in our economic
model, agents are sometimes rewarded for behavior that does not seem to be
good for the community as a whole (e.g. when some of the sellers raised their
price while lowering the quality they offered). The rewards, we are finding,
start to diminish as the other agents become “smarter”. We can intuit that
the agents in these systems will eventually settle on some level of nesting that
balances their costs of keeping nested models with their gains from taking
better actions (Kauffman, 1994). It would be very useful to characterize the
environments, agent populations, and types of “equilibria” that these might
lead to, especially as interest in multi-agent systems grows.
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